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It is not often that we get front-row seats to watch 
a financial crisis spread like a disease, especially a crisis 
so deep and severe that some compare it to the Great 
Depression. Americans were unprepared for the recent 
financial crisis, let alone one that had more depth and 
duration than any other in the past quarter century. Many 
months have passed since Lehman Brothers collapsed, 
and the credit markets are slowly unthawing. Even so, 
the aftershocks of this crisis are still being felt around the 
globe. David Faber describes in elaborate detail why finan-
cial institutions must maintain the trust of their investors 
and why a lack of confidence nearly destroyed capitalism. 
He provides an intense understanding of how complex 
financial products are developed and circulate through 
the global financial system, while adding a unique per-
spective to the story by providing the reader with real-life 
examples of how the crisis has affected peoples’ lives. This 
text is a treasure for faculty searching for ways to discuss 
the business world, which is essentially the mission field of 
Christian business students. 
I would recommend that Christian business faculty 
read Faber’s account of the crisis and consider its suit-
ability for classroom use. My recommendation is based 
on three of the book’s characteristics. First, Faber has a 
distinctive ability to portray the crisis from individual 
perspectives. His personal approach makes the book com-
prehensible to a wide array of college students. Second, 
the impact of the global financial crisis is currently affect-
ing college students in areas such as loan approval and 
limited employment opportunities. Such felt impact gives 
Christian faculty an opportunity to illustrate the intercon-
nections among business, community, ethics, and personal 
responsibility. Third, Faber’s exhaustive personal inter-
views reveal how countless people inadvertently played a 
role in this crisis. His analysis highlights the depth of soci-
ety’s need for reform by emphasizing the moral and ethical 
dilemmas faced by different constituents. 
The rise of materialism is one of many salient points 
of the book. Before the financial crisis peaked, the United 
States economy was in a period of declining personal 
savings rates; and consumers were becoming increas-
ingly reliant on leverage through credit card utilization. 
In addition to declining personal savings rates, financial 
literacy had also deteriorated. The catastrophic collision 
of these two conditions created an environment in which 
people began using the equity in their homes as an ATM 
machine. Through Faber’s documentation, it becomes 
clear that people had become obsessed with accumulating 
material possessions. His interpretation of these events was 
that everyone has a different definition of the “American 
Dream.” For some, the old American Dream of home 
ownership now included items such as swimming pools, 
fancy automobiles, and designer apparel.  
Faber does not stop at describing human greed as the 
only element for the crisis. He describes other contributing 
factors: changing societal relationships and leadership. In 
the financial marketplace, the relationships between banker 
and borrower had changed and so had the methodology 
of being approved for a loan. The epoch of establishing a 
banking relationship, saving for a substantial down pay-
ment, and providing documents which verified employ-
ment and income had vanished. So had the era of simple 
product offerings. New complicated mortgage products, 
such as interest only or negative amortization loans, were 
being sold by questionable mortgage originators on the 
basis of one rapid phone conversation. These exotic finan-
cial products were peddled to people with less than a stel-
lar credit history and who often did not understand the 
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legal documents they were required to sign, as well as their 
financial obligations.    
As for changes in leadership, the loan origination 
profession and banks’ appetite for risk had also drasti-
cally changed over the past quarter century. Historically, 
loans had been underwritten by banks who intended to 
hold them until maturity. Because the bank would ulti-
mately bear the collection risk, loan originators at banks 
needed to be educated and trained in risk management. 
However, this new sub-prime lending industry experienced 
rapid growth during a period of low unemployment. The 
low unemployment rate coupled with the fact that banks 
quickly sold mortgage products to Wall Street created 
an environment in which unsophisticated paper pushers, 
who had received minimal training, were suddenly highly 
compensated. This rapidly expanding brigade of subprime 
mortgage originators suddenly started fighting over bor-
rowers in a feverish attempt to line their pockets. In some 
instances, mortgage originators falsified applicant infor-
mation to close loans rapidly and to quench the thirst of 
investment bankers who had an endless yearning for mort-
gages. Inexperienced mortgage originators were unaware of 
the systemic risk they were adding to the global financial 
markets. The leadership exhibited by this new mortgage 
industry was mainly their eagerness in servicing their two 
customers: borrowers stretching for their piece of the 
American Dream and Wall Street craving more mortgages. 
The rivalry among banks fighting for additional mortgages 
intensified, lending standards deteriorated, and riskier 
loans were approved which created a housing bubble ready 
to explode.   
Countless mortgages were purchased by investment 
banks and packaged together into complex structured 
products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
CDOs were then sold to investors around the globe who 
did not comprehend the underlying investment risks asso-
ciated with structured products. Just to illustrate how com-
plicated those financial instruments were, the author inter-
viewed former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan. 
Greenspan depicted the convoluted investment products 
being advocated by investment banks as follows: “Some of 
the complexities of some of the [financial] instruments that 
were going into CDOs bewilders me” (p. 95). 
However, before sub-prime mortgages were packaged 
into CDOs and sold to investors, they were turned over to 
rating agencies for evaluation. Rating agencies were hired 
to calculate expected losses on pools of mortgages in order 
to assign the structured product a risk rating. They found 
themselves in the peculiar circumstance of needing to issue 
numerous ratings on mortgages underwritten to borrow-
ers with low credit scores and high loan-to-value ratios in 
a period of escalating home prices without historical data 
for benchmarking purposes. Although rating agencies are 
concerned about protecting their reputations, they faced 
minimal consequences if the ratings they issued were not 
accurate or if home values unexpectedly declined. Faber 
elaborately describes the role rating agencies played in the 
financial crisis as follows: “Most people at rating agencies 
are honest individuals. They’re trying to feed their fam-
ily. There is no evil intent. It is simply that they’re over-
whelmed. They don’t have the tools. They don’t have the 
training.” (p 90)  
Faber does not leave the government’s role out of 
the crisis equation. After all, the government is a body of 
public servants who in theory should have known about 
the mounting systemic risk associated with extensive lend-
ing. Through interviews with government officials, the 
author exposes the fact that some officials were aware of 
the mounting mortgage problem but were unable to drum 
up support among congressional colleagues to address 
potential systemic risk. Many politicians were unwilling to 
stop a wave of lending that had allowed millions of their 
constituents a chance to own their own home or live their 
idea of the American Dream. Alan Greenspan publicly 
acknowledged that he was aware of some flagrant lending 
practices and personally contemplated additional regula-
tion; but he realized that, without proper enforcement, 
lenders would use new regulations to promote further 
outrageous practices and products. He also believed that 
executives understood their fiduciary responsibilities and 
would not endanger the survival of their own institutions. 
Faber’s book is an inside look at the implosion of the 
global financial system. His unique ability to personalize 
individual stories of greed, failed regulatory policies, and 
systemic risk makes it impossible for readers to discon-
nect themselves from the catastrophic meltdown. Today, 
people are trying to place blame for the global economic 
crisis. Wall Street is an easy target. The subtitle on the 
cover of the book reads, “How Wall Street’s Greed and 
Stupidity Brought Capitalism to Its Knees.” It is baffling 
why Faber used that subtitle, when throughout the book, 
he clearly documented that the spectrum of blame ranged 
from unsophisticated consumers to decorated scholars and 
included our democratic government. Faber used the book 
like a canvas to paint a picture of a raging sea filled with 
societal greed and corruption as the primary culprit for the 
near collapse of the financial system, yet chose a subtitle 
that would present a view of being able to effortlessly iso-
late the responsibility of the spiraling crisis to one group, 
Wall Street.   
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The recent global financial crisis will have an ambigu-
ous impact on business professionals in the future. The 
book gives the reader an appreciation for how complex, 
fragile, and interconnected the global financial system is. 
It also reveals how a change in one interconnected part 
can have a profound and uncertain impact on various 
stakeholders’ even years after a change is made. Historians 
have only begun to write about this financial earthquake, 
and aftershocks are still being felt around the globe. What 
we do know is that the financial system nearly collapsed 
due to our greedy cultural preferences of personal pos-
sessions and lack of focus on societal good. Today, our 
government is trying to create and enforce laws that will 
make banks and businesses morally responsible. This text, 
which contains pictures of people whose lives have been 
irrevocably altered, is a vivid illustration of our fallen 
society. I consider this book a must read for those of us 
who teach business and who are desperately searching for 
inspirational messages that will assist students in discern-
ing their mission field.
 
R E F E R E N C E
Faber, D. (2009). And then the roof caved in. New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Geddes - Book Review: And Then the Roof Caved In
